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NOTE
JUDICIAL FINANCIAL AUTONOMY AND
INHERENT POWER
In 1965 the National Conference of Court Administrators and
Conference of Chief Justices adopted a statement of principles asserting
the need for the financial independence of courts.' Judicial finance,
the statement concluded, "should be exercised free of interference by
agents of the executive branch of government, in the same manner that
the executive and legislative branches administer the funds appropriated
for their internal operations. ' 2 Growing pressure upon court services,
inadequate appropriations, and slow and expensive litigation have com-
bined to spur judicial demands for the independent control of internal
fiscal management as well as of appropriations to the judiciary. While
centralizing judicial administration and encouraging internal economy
may increase the resources available to courts, substantial improvements
in resulting services are ultimately dependent upon the amount of ap-
propriations.8 The apathy, hostility, or conservatism of the legislature
1 National Conference of Court Administrators and Conference of Chief Jus-
tices, Statement of Principles: The Need for Independence in Judicial Administration, 50
J. Am. Jun. Soc'y 129 (1966). Similar principles were adopted by the First Judicial Con-
ference of the Americas, Justice William 0. Douglas representing the United States, in
May 1965. See Judicial Independence is Keynote of Judicial Conference of the Americas,
49 J. A.m. JuD. Soc'y 44 (1965).
2 National Conference of Court Administrators and Conference of Chief Justices,
supra note 1, at 130.
Only through the responsible exercise of an unhampered authority to manage
their own fiscal affairs can the courts successfully keep pace with the expanding
demands for effective judicial services in our modern society.
Within the limits set by the funds made generally available by law, courts
should have full responsibility for supervising the employees upon whom they
must rely to administer the business of the courts. Thus, the independent au-
thority of courts to hire and fire their employees, to fix and adjust their salaries,
and to assign them duties should not be subject to the approval or control of any
non-judicial agency.
8 The need for centralized judicial administration has been widely recognized and
the practice has been adopted by 37 states and by the federal government. CouNCIL OF
STATE GovERm ENTs, THE BooK OF THE STATES 1970-1971, at 118 (1971); Burger, Deferred
Maintenance of Judicial Machinery, 43 N.Y.S.B.J. 383 (1971); Nixon,- To Improve the
Process of Justice, 43 N.Y.S.BJ. 312 (1971).
Occasionally those who call for judicial unity appear to be less concerned with efii-
cient administration and economy than with effective bargaining position vis-A-vis the
other branches:
The executive and legislative branches, by their inherent structure, have always
been well organized and fully capable of protecting and advancing their interests.
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and executive4 have in the past induced the courts to exercise their
inherent power 5 to compel those recalcitrant branches to allocate the
funds required for needed court services. 6 Extended application of this
coercive aspect of judicial independence may provide a solution to
what some legal scholars see as a potential crisis in judicial finance and
administration.7
The inherent nature of the judicial branch, with only its connecting thread of
appellate review, does not give sufficient form or definition to dearly establish an
equal and coordinate branch of government.... The judicial branch of govern-
ment must have some administrative unity in order to better be able to assume
its own responsibilities in relation to such things as personnel and fiscal matters.
In so eliminating the unwarranted encroachment of nonjudicial agencies, a
stronger and more independent judiciary will be created and the benefits of such
will flow to all.
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 19TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE CON-
FERENCE OF CHIEF JusrICEs 63 (1967).
4 Testimony at a recent budget hearing before the Philadelphia City Council reflects
the problem: "The Judiciary can no longer permit its rate of progress and efficiency to
be measured by a non-responsive and antagonistic executive who completely misunder-
stands the role and function of a separate and distinct branch of government." Testimony
of Judge Vincent A. Carroll before the Philadelphia City Council, May 4, 1970, quoted in
Brief for Appellant at 82, Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d
193, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971) (on fie at the Cornell Law Review).
5 Inherent power is that power not expressly provided for in the constitution of
government but which may be exercised by a branch of government to protect itself in the
performance of its duties. The most important use of inherent power for the judicial
branch is that allowing the courts to punish for contempt; other uses include the
ability to honor letters rogatory (see Ex parte Taylor, 110 Tex. 331, 220 S.W. 74 (1920)),
to grant bail (see State ex rel. Syverson v. Foster, 84 Wash. 58, 146 P. 169 (1915)),
to control photography in court (see Ex parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 A. 312 (1927)),
and to appoint counsel for a criminal defendant (see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932)). See also In re Surcharge of County Comm'rs, 12 Pa. D. & C. 471, 478-80
(C.P. Lackawanna County 1929). The inherent power doctrine has as its basis the con-
cept of separation of powers. See notes 54-58 and accompanying text infra.
6 See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193, cert. de-
nied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971).
The sources of disagreement are complex, but one explanation may be an organiza-
tional paradox:
Financing and staffing of courts are wrought [sic] with conflict--conflict between
principles of public administration that hold that the tax levying body should
control the agency it supports, and American political theory that holds that
courts must be independent of the legislative and executive branches.
Gallas, The Planning Function of the Court Administrator, 50 J. AM. JUD. SoC'Y 268, 269
(1967).
7 The crisis extends not only to court congestion and delay but also to the compe-
tency and number of court personnel and judges. For discussions of the crisis, see PREsi-
DENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE PEPORT:
THE CouRTs 80-90 (1967); Burger, The State of the Judiciary, 56 A.B.AJ. 929 (1970);
Twenty-Seventh American Assembly, The Courts, the Public and the Law Explosion,
49 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 16 (1965).
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I
STANDARDS IN THE USE OF INHERENT POWER
A. Background
Under state constitutional provisions, the executive generally pro-
poses and administers the fiscal policies of government while the legis-
lature raises and allocates public funds.8 Through either a sense of
comity or a recognition of public needs, the legislature and executive
generally cooperate with the judiciary to meet the courts' anticipated
costs.9 This cooperation is not always possible. Political and economic
considerations often dictate that the comparatively unassertive requests
of the judiciary be neglected.' 0
When the budget proposal of the judiciary exceeds the allotment
acceptable to the other branches," judges usually rely on political
pressure and compromise rather than confrontation to preserve the
integrity of their proposals.' 2 Historically, use of coercive power has
8 See, e.g., N.Y. CONsr. art. V I, § 1.
9 For an exhaustive survey of the budgetary procedure involving judicial costs in
state and local government, see INsTITuTE OF JUDICIAL ADmiNsRATION, STATE ANDz LOCAL
FINANCING OF THE COURTS (Tent. Rep. 1969). The judicial branch generally limits its de-
mands whenever possible. Id. at 2.
10 As a practical matter, judicial budgets for court operations are relatively incon-
sequential in amount, ranging, for example, from .04% of the 1966 Pennsylvania state
budget to 1.84% of the Connecticut budget. Id. at 17. By comparison, the federal govern-
ment spent approximately .06% of its total budget on the federal judicial system in the
same year. Saari, Open Doors to Justice-An Overview of Financing Justice in America,
50 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 296 (1967). Complicating factors in assessing the amount of judicial
budgets include the practice of splitting fiscal responsibility between local and state gov-
ernments and the use of income from fees and fines to supplement appropriations. INSI-
TUTE OF JtDICIAL ADMINisTRATION, supra note 9, at 3-4.
11 In almost all states the judicial budget proposal is submitted to the executive and
legislative branches for review, modification, and eventual incorporation into the overall
state budget. In over 30 states the executive may make substantial revisions in the budget
prior to submission to the legislative branch. INsrrrUm OF JumCAL AnsMNISRATION, supra
note 9, at 67-71.
An important aspect of court finance is the division of support between state and
local governments. In approximately one half of the states judicial expenses are financed
locally. In ten states (California, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Virginia) expenses are shared between local and
state governments. Id. at 80-31. In New York, for example, the state pays approximately
20%, New York City 45%, and local jurisdictions the balance of total judicial costs for
the state. This division of fiscal responsibility has paralyzed courts where local communi-
ties have refused to shoulder the increasing cost of judicial administration. NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COURT ADMINIsTRATIVE OFFICERS, SUM MARY OF THE FOURTENTH ANNUAL
MEETING 3 (1968).
12 Illustrative of such political pressures was the recent enactment by the Administra-
tive Board of the Judicial Conference of the State of New York of rules limiting trial
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been confined to minor, if necessary, matters of court administration.13
Rarely have courts utilized their inherent power to compel appropria-
tion of funds for judicial administration; 14 resort to this tactic has been
delay. 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 29 (proposed eff. date May 1, 1972). In substance the rules provided
that all criminal defendants being held in custody pending trial, except those accused of
homicide or for whom good cause is shown for continued detention, would be released
on bail or on their own recognizance if they were not brought to trial within 90 days.
Moreover, if the defendant other than one accused of homicide were not brought to trial
within six months from the date of his arrest, the prosecution would be dismissed with
prejudice unless an extension was granted for good cause. Chief Judge Stanley H. Fuld
recognized the pressures this plan would place on the fiscal bodies of the state:
The Administrative Board is thoroughly aware of the fact that, if these rules
are to prove effective, the wherewithal for additional facilities, personnel and
services, so long denied to the courts and the other agencies involved will have to
be made available by those having control of the purse strings.
Judicial Conference of the State of New York, Press Release, April 30, 1970, at 3 (on file
at the Cornell Law Review).
These rules never came into effect. Before May 1, 1972, the New York legislature
enacted its own "speedy trial" plan. Ch. 184 [1972] N.Y. Laws 398. This plan has con-
siderably weaker provisions than the Judicial Conference plan.
13 See, e.g., Powers v. Isley, 66 Ariz. 94, 183 P.2d 880 (1947) (compelling resources for
court reporters); Noble County Council v. State ex rel. Fifer, 234 Ind. 172, 125 N.E.2d 709
(1955) (probation officers); Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493,
29 N.E.2d 405 (1940) (lawyer); Dunn v. State ex rel. Corydon, 204 Ind. 390, 184 N.E. 535
(1933) (page); Board of Comm'rs v. Gwin, 136 Ind. 562, 36 N.E. 237 (1894) (repairs); Board
of Comm'rs v. Stout, 136 Ind. 53, 35 N.E. 683 (1893) (elevator); In re Appointment of
Clerk, 297 S.W.2d 764 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957) (clerk); Bass v. County of Saline, 171 Neb. 538,
106 N.W.2d 860 (1960) (clerk); State ex rel. Kitzmeyer v. Davis, 26 Nev. 373, 68 P. 689
(1902) (courtroom chairs and carpet); State ex rel. Finley v. Pfeiffer, 163 Ohio St. 149, 126
NE.2d 57 (1955) (court rooms); Bar Ass'n v. County of Marion, 162 Ohio St. 345, 123
N.E.2d 521 (1954) (elevator); In re Court Room, 148 Wis. 109, 134 N.W. 490 (1912) (court
facilities); In re Janitor of Supreme Court, 35 Wis. 410 (1874) (janitor).
Even in the recent cases, use of the inherent power has been limited to relatively
conservative demands for funds for continuing functions. See notes 21-36 and accompany-
ing text infra. The evolving standards for the use of inherent power may, however, lead
to a much more aggressive judicial stance in the future. See notes 57-63 and accompanying
text infra.
14 The very conception of inherent power [in the court] carries with it the im-
plication that its use is for occasions not provided for by established methods ....
When, however, these methods fail and the court shall determine that by ob-
serving them the assistance necessary for the due and effective exercise of its own
functions cannot be had, or when an emergency arises which the established
methods cannot or do not instantly meet, then and not until then does occasion
arise for the exercise of the inherent power.
State ex rel. Hillis v. Sullivan, 48 Mont. 320, 329, 137 P. 392, 395 (1913). See also Los
Angeles County v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. 380, 28 P. 1062 (1892); Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa.
52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949).
Some observers are more candid in their explanation of the hesitancy to use inherent
power: "[Few lower court judges have the desire or the courage to order other local
officials to provide necessary funds, although a few have done so. Political reasons related
to job tenure account for reticence upon the part of most." JumcLAL REsEAR cH FouNmA-
TbON, INC., STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL JusricE 22 (A. Logan ed. 1969).
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eschewed whenever other grounds for compelling appropriations have
been available.15 No court, however, has denied its inherent power to
compel funds. The issue is principally the extent of the power rather
than its existence. Since most litigation concerning judicial appropria-
tions has originated at the municipal level, appellate forums have
assumed increased significance as much needed arbiters of intergovern-
mental conflict.'8 Rarely confronting state legislatures and executives
in litigation concerning their own budgets,17 state appellate courts may
profoundly affect the fiscal appropriations of inferior judicial units
without being challenged by a co-equal branch.
The courts have advanced several standards establishing the limits
of judicial discretion in the use of inherent power. These standards
range from a basically defensive posture, 8 which seeks to preserve only
the essential elements of judicial administration, to an offensive stance,
which encourages more extensive judicial independence in expanding
and developing necessary and reasonable court programs. 19 While none
of these standards is subject to precise definition, all reflect the courts'
understanding of their constitutional mandate and concomitant obliga-
tion to protect it.20
15 While the remedy of coercing appropriations from intransigent legislators or ex-
ecutives can be explained in terms of inherent judicial power, courts have sometimes found
more explicit authority in statutes or state constitutions for the proposition that they were
entitled to the funds. See, e.g., State ex rel. Foster v. Board of County Comm'rs, 16 Ohio
St. 2d 89, 242 N-.2d 884 (1968) (statute requiring commissioners to "appropriate such-...
money each year as will meet all the administrative expense of the juvenile court" and
placing determination of that amount in sound discretion of court); Carlson v. State ex
rel. Stodola, 247 Ind. 631, 220 N.E.d 532 (1966) (state constitutional provision that "[j]ustice
shall be administered freely, and without purchase; completely and without denial;
speedily and without delay" held to invalidate statute reposing veto of judicial budget in
local council).
16 The problem of an impartial forum, arising from the seeming conflict of interest
of the judicial branch acting as a judge for its own cause, has been countered by selecting
judges from outside the area of conflict. This approach does not resolve the basic prob-
lem, but, as a practical matter, it does provide a tribunal in which the matter can be
heard and conclusively determined. For the legal arguments on both sides of the issue,
see Brief for Appellant, App. I1, at 6-12, Brief for Appellee, App. III, at 17-30, Common-
wealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971)
(on file at the Cornell Law Review).
17 For examples of litigation between co-equal branches at the highest state level,
see State ex rel. Schneider v. Cunningham, 39 Mont. 165, 101 P. 962 (1909) (payment of
wages to supreme court stenographer denied by legislature); State ex rel. Kitzmeyer v.
Davis, 26 Nev. 373, 68 P. 689 (1902) (funds for chairs and carpet required by supreme
court refused by legislatively created board of capitol commissioners).
18 See notes 21-26 and accompanying text infra.
19 See notes 37-51 and accompanying text infra.
20 Compare the outspoken judicial pronouncements on which courts have been able
to rely cited in note 15 supra.
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B. Evolution of Standards
In Judges for the Third Judicial Circuit v. County of Wayne,21 the
Supreme Court of Michigan fashioned a test designed to avoid judicial
interference with the existing legislative machinery for funding the
courts in all but the most extreme cases of legislative parsimony.2 2 The
court concluded that inherent power should be used only when inade-
quate appropriations would impair the "effectively continuing function
of the Court.' 23 In this instance, the court held that while the judicial
branch may have a keen interest in the requested expansion of proba-
tion and clerk services, the record did not justify the cost as being of
practical necessity to the court's continued functioning.24 The Judges
standard thus emphasized the element of necessity in preference to
broader criteria employed by other courts.25 Significantly, the test did
not admit to a standard balancing the relative needs of the three govern-
mental branches; practical necessity in the most absolute sense was
chosen as the sole standard.26
In Leahey v. Farrell,r a Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas28
had entered an order increasing the compensation of its official court
reporters without having first presented the proposed salary increases
to the county salary review board.29 Upon the county commissioners'
21 383 Mich. 10, 172 N.W.2d 436 (1969).
22 The case arose out of the refusal of officials of Wayne County to provide funds
for additional probation officers, law clerks, and for a judicial assistant for the county
circuit court. The writ of mandamus compelling those funds was refused in part, the
majority seeing administrative inherent power as a narrowly defined but necessary con-
comitant to judicial power. Id. at 21, 172 N.W.2d at 440. The lower appellate court had
found statutory authority for each of the judges' demands and granted the writ as to all.
15 Mich. App. 713, 167 N.W.2d 337 (1969). On appeal, however, relief was granted only
as to expense for the judicial assistant. 383 Mich. at 32, 172 N.W.2d at 445.
23 383 Mich. at 23, 172 N.W.2d at 441.
24 Corrections, pardons, and paroles are historically the primary responsibility
of the executive branch of government. And while such things are appropriately
within the purview of a broad concept of the needs of justice, they are not
normally a part of the narrower notion of practical necessities of effectively con-
tinuing court functioning.
Id. at 26, 172 N.W.2d at 442.
25 See notes 37-51 and accompanying text infra.
26 "[W]e deliberately choose the narrower term .... The test is not relative need,
but practical necessity." 383 Mich. at 23, 172 N.W.2d at 441 (emphasis in original).
27 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949).
28 The Court of Common Pleas, of which there is one for each judicial district in
Pennsylvania, has unlimited jurisdiction in all cases except as may otherwise be provided
by law. PA. CoNsr. art. V, § 5. Although a part of the state's unified judicial system, the
Court of Common Pleas derives funds from municipal governments. 16 P.S. §§ 1822, 1823.
29 Pennsylvania law provided that in counties of the fourth class:
salaries and compensation ...shall be fixed by the salary board created by
this act....
[Vol. 57:975
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and comptroller's refusal to honor the court order, the reporters brought
a mandamus action before the same court to compel compliance.30
The writ was issued but on appeal the state supreme court reversed,
holding that non-compliance with methods for determining court
salaries established by the legislature precluded compulsory payment
of the increased compensation. 31
Although it dismissed the writ, the Leahey court did recognize the
inherent right of the judiciary to force the legislature to provide re-
quired funds. The standard used, however, was slightly different from
that embraced by the court in Judges. Acknowledging that the separa-
tion of powers doctrine imposes limits upon judicial functions,-2 the
court nonetheless observed that
[s]hould the legislature, or the county salary board, act arbitrarily
or capriciously and fail or neglect to provide a sufficient number of
court employees or for the payment of adequate salaries to them,
whereby the efficient administration of justice is impaired or
destroyed, the court possesses the inherent power to supply the
deficiency.P
The emphasis upon judicial power to require financing for the
essential needs of efficient court administration is important. 4 The
court did not suggest the use of inherent power either to expand or to
improve present programs; however, the court did assert its right to
... Mhe board shall ... fix the compensation of all... court criers, tipstaves
and other court employees, and of all officers, clerks, stenographers and employees
appointed by the judges of any court and who are paid from the county treasury.
Act of July 5, 1947, § 23, P.L. 1380, quoted in 362 Pa. at 54, 66 A.2d at 578.
30 Although an action in mandamus is most often used to compel financial support,
other remedies have been employed. See, e.g., Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 884 P.2d 758
(1963) (declaratory judgment); In re Appointment of Clerk, 297 S.W.2d 764 (Ky. Ct. App.
1957) (ex parte order); Bass v. County of Saline, 171 Neb. 538, 106 N.W.2d 860 (1960)
(debt); Zangerle v. Court of Common Pleas, 141 Ohio St. 70, 46 NE.2d 865 (1945) (evic-
tion order); State ex rel. Reynolds v. County Court, 11 Wis. 2d 560, 105 N.W.2d 876
(1960) (contempt).
31 362 Pa. at 59-60, 66 A.2d at 580.
32 Control of state finances rests with the legislature, subject only to constitutional
limitations .... The function of the judiciary to administer justice does not
include the power to levy taxes in order to defray the necessary expenses in con-
nection therewith. It is the legislature which must supply such funds.
Id. at 57, 66 A.2d at 579 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
83 Id. at 58, 66 A.2d at 580.
34 In In re Surcharge of County Comm'rs, 12 Pa. D. & C. 471 (C.P. Lackawanna
County 1929), the court held that the only limit on inherent power was that its exercise
be reasonably necessary. Although Leahey qualified this standard, the reasonable and
necessary criterion was attributed in subsequent cases to dicta in Leahey. See notes 43-50
and accompanying text infra.
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decide its own fiscal requirements and, if these requirements were not
adequately met in the context of reasonable procedures, to use its
remedial machinery to compel proper funding.
The conservative standards of Leahey and Judges have rarely re-
sulted in serious confrontations, 3 primarily because of their defensive
nature and, perhaps, because they have a firm foundation in accepted
notions of. basic judicial functions. Experience may add new substance
to these tests if the basic material needs of the courts change. As views
concerning the basic functions of courts change, even the most
expansive use of inherent power may be justified in terms of essential
needs.86
Cases in which the judiciary has cast its prerogatives in broad
terms are not new. 7 Often, however, where a court has used sweeping
language when granting monies requested, its holding is more ap-
propriately explained in terms of a statutory grant of fiscal authority
to a court, or a specific state constitutional mandate directed at the
judiciary.88
Elements of both factors were present in Smith v. Miller,9 a 1963
decision of the Colorado Supreme Court empowering the judges of
each judicial district to fix "reasonable" salaries for court employees.
Four judges of the district court in El Paso County conducted a
survey of salary scales in other judicial districts and, based upon their
findings and assessment of employee ability, established a schedule of
compensation. When the county commissioner rejected several recom-
mendations, the district court issued a writ of mandamus. The ap-
plicable statute provided that judges of the district court could fix
35 See, e.g., cases cited in note 13 supra.
36 Minimally, the necessities of judicial administration are those functions which
protect the constitutional rights of litigants. Protection of such rights may serve as the
lowest denominator in defining necessary court functions. Of course this denominator may
fluctuate with changes in constitutional interpretations. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961) (establishing need for pre-trial hearings on admissibility of evidence); Miranda
v. Arizona, 884 U.S. 436 (1966) (creating need for pre-trial hearings on voluntariness of
confessions).
Moreover, administrative requirements may vary from court to court. The Judges
court observed:
We do not propose here to, itemize those expenses which are necessaries.
What may be deemed necessary for an appellate court may not be essential in a
trial court. What may be crucial in a metropolitan court may be superfluous in
the hinterlands.
383 Mich. at 23, 172 N.W.2d at 441.
37 See, e.g., In re Court Room, 148 Wis. 109, 134 N.W. 490 (1912).
88 See note 15 supra.
39 153 Colo. 35, 884 P2d 738 (1963).
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salaries "subject to the approval of the county commissioners." 40 The
state supreme court, affirming mandamus, wove constitutional princi-
ples into its interpretation of the statute4 and held that
in the absence of a dear showing that the acts of the judges in
fixing such salaries were arbitrary and capricious and that the
salaries so fixed are unreasonable and unjustified . . . it is the
ministerial duty of the county commissioners to approve them and
to provide the means for payment of such salaries.42
The burden of proof was thus shifted to the county commissioners to
show that the assessment was unjustified,43 whereas under the Leahey
standard the judiciary itself had the burden of proving that a similar
salary increase was necessary for the efficient administration of justice.
Significantly, the standard relied on in Smith was reasonableness, and
not the strict necessity criterion of the more conservative cases.
40 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-16-1, 56-3-8 (1963).
41 [it must be assumed that the legislature acted with full knowledge of relevant
constitutional provisions ... [and] inherent judicial powers existing... ; that it
did not intend to create a situation amounting to a departure from the general
concept of democratic government; and that it sought to recognize and confirm
inherent powers rather than destroy them.
153 Colo. at 39, 384 P.2d at 740. The court found that, in light of a state constitutional
mandate dividing the powers of government into three departments, the legislature
could not have meant to do violence to the principle that
courts have the inherent power to carry on their functions so that they may
operate independently and not become dependent upon or a supplicant of either
of the other departments of government, and may incur necessary and reasonable
expenses in the performance of their judicial duties ....
Id. at 41, 384 P.2d at 741.
42 Id. at 41, 284 P.2d at 741.
The issue of ministerial duty rather than discretion pertains to the operation of
mandamus. The writ is traditionally limited to instances involving an official duty to
act in a ministerial, non-discretionary capacity. See, eg., State ex rel. Town & Suburb
Dev. Co. v. Maser, 172 Ohio St. 505, 178 N.E2d 791 (1961) (mandamus could not be
used to control legislative discretion); Huey v. King, 220 Tenn. 189, 415 S.W.2d 126
(1967) (mandamus will lie against mayor and aldermen if duty is ministerial). See
also cases cited in Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 54-55, 274 A2d
193, 198, cert. denied, 492 US. 974 (1971). The use of inherent power to substitute
judicial discretion for the judgment of the legislature and executive indicates a pos-
sible expansion of mandamus along lines similar to judicial review. For a discussion
of the writ with respect to judicial review, see Weintraub, Development of Scope of Re-
view in Judicial Review of Administrative Action: Mandamus and Review of Discretion,
33 FoasAam L. REv. 359 (1965).
43 The presumption of reasonableness attaching to the court's financial request, and
the concomitant shift in the burden of proof, have not been widely followed. The rationale
of such conservatism may perhaps be found in the lingering impression, even in jurisdic-
tions that have taken a more aggressive position, that courts should justify their needs
in the context of traditional legislative and executive control over government fiscal
policy.
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More recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth
ex rel. Carroll v. Tate44 departed from the standards advanced in Leahey
and Judges. That case was based solely on the doctrine of implied
judicial power and was decided in the context of a modern metropolitan
judicial system. Upholding the lower court's competence to mandate
funds for its operation, the majority stated that "the Judiciary must
possess the inherent power to determine and compel payment of those
sums of money which are reasonable and necessary to carry out its
mandated responsibilities, and its powers and duties to administer
Justice."' 45 The defensive use of inherent power was abandoned in
favor of an aggressive application of the standard of reasonableness.
The major portion of a previously denied budget request for probation
officers,46 court personnel, and services was sustained as "reasonable
and necessary." 47 In so doing, the supreme court overruled the Phila-
delphia City Council's rejection of items requested in the normal
budget process 48 and compelled funds not previously requested from
the Council.49
44 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971). The Court of Common
Pleas submitted a $19 million budget for fiscal year 1970-71 to the finance director of
Philadelphia. In hearings before the City Council the court justified and was granted a
reduced proposal, but requested an additional $5.2 million, approximately $2 million of
which had not previously been requested. Upon the Council's rejection of the request, a
writ of mandamus compelling payment of $2,458,000 was granted, and the Council ap-
pealed.
45 Id. at 52, 274 A.2d at 197 (emphasis in original).
46 But cf. note 24 and accompanying text supra.
47 442 Pa. at 52, 274 A.2d at 197.
The Carroll court appears to rely heavily on what it sees as the Leahey precedent of
reasonable necessity. The court in Leahey, however, qualified the reasonableness test by
requiring that the denial of funds must endanger the efficient administration of justice
before use of the inherent power would be justified. See notes 21-28 and accompanying text
supra.
48 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court sustained the lower court's treatment of the
Court of Common Pleas' request. The reasons why certain items were disallowed, de-
creased, or left intact are not clear from the opinion. The majority simply agreed with
the lower court's conclusion that "the amount recommended by Mayor Tate and ap-
proved by Council is inadequate to meet the reasonable needs of the Court [of Common
Pleas] for the present fiscal year." 442 Pa. at 57, 274 A.2d at 199-200. The supreme court
considered, as did the lower court, the time remaining in the year and correspondingly
reduced the request. The complete tabulation of the initial request and award by the
superior court is as follows:
Original 9/30170
Request Court Order
Adult Probation $1,782,216 $ 800,000
Juvenile Probation 539,922 250,000
Data Processing 453,934 250,000
Apprehension of Fugitives 335,910 285,000
Courtroom Personnel 224,452 100,000
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Carroll provides an important precedent for urban courts facing
criminal justice delay. The inherent power doctrine was used to compel
funds needed to meet the demands of criminal justice administration,
even in the face of serious urban financial problems. In applying the
standard of reasonable necessity, however, the court cautioned that
[t]he Court does not have unlimited power to obtain from the City
whatever sums it would like or believes it needs for its proper
functioning or adequate administration. Its wants and needs must
be proved by it to be "reasonably necessary" for its proper function-
ing and administration, and this is always subject to Court review.50
Although it mentioned the Leahey impairment of justice standard,
the Carroll majority expanded the concept, adopting a flexible test of
reasonableness keyed to the constantly changing demands upon the
judicial system.51 Perhaps no more specific standard is possible. It was
clear to the majority, however, that in determining what expenses are
reasonably necessary, the general financial condition of the city need
not be considered.5 2 Under the Carroll test inherent power may be
Original Court Order
Request 9/30170
Attorney Fees 800,000 800,000
Arbitration Fees 890,000 200,000
Writ Service 100,000 75,000
Gibson Building Personnel 227,086 Disallowed
Probation Relocation 24,500 Disallowed
Repairs-1801 Vine Street 40,000 Disallowed
Janitorial Staff 56,940 Disallowed
Microfilm 96,822 Disallowed
Bail Project 172,857 Disallowed
Dental Equipment 10,418 Disallowed
Domestic Relations 61,912 Disallowed
Total Copy System 28,000 28,000
Building Services 145,877 Disallowed
Law Clerks 1883,206 100,000
Station Wagon 2,320 Disallowed
Prothonotary Relocation 35,000 -
Crime Commission Grant 75,000 75,000
Totals $5,280,817 $2,458,000
Id. at 50, 274 A.2d at 196.
49 justice Pomeroy, however, expressed reservation in dismissing procedural irregu-
larities in the court's additional request. Id. at 68-69, 274 A.2d at 203 (concurring opinion).
50 Id. at 57, 274 A.2d at 199 (emphasis in original).
51 Id.
52 The City Council argued, inter alia, that Philadelphia's general financial condition
should be considered when determining what is "reasonably necessary" for the "efficient
administration of justice." The demand for additional funds for both the maintenance
and the improvement of public services and general public welfare, the essential increases
in wages, and the rise in purchasing costs had placed a severe drain on every govern-
mental unit. Nevertheless, the court answered, the deplorable financial conditions in
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utilized to compel resources for any reasonable judicial function. The
assessment of needs, measured by a broad constitutional mandate to
administer justice, is left to the judicial branch.
II
SCOPE OF INHERENT POWER
A. Basis in Separation of Powers
Courts have recognized that the exercise and scope of inherent
judicial power are closely related to principles underlying the separa-
tion of powers in our constitutional system.53 Unless it is to be a sub-
ordinate branch of government, a status contrary to the provisions of
most state constitutions,"4 the judiciary must possess either the express
or implied power to preserve its integrity and perform its duties. Since
the degree of financial support is a major, if not determinative, factor
in the quality of justice, 5 the use of inherent power to sustain and
promote reasonable and necessary judicial functions can arguably be
justified.
The Carroll standard for invoking inherent power gives the judi-
Philadelphia must yield to the constitutional mandate that the judiciary shall be free
and independent and able to provide an efficient and effective system of justice. Id. at 56,
274 A.2d at 199. But cf. note 71 and accompanying text infra.
53 The judiciary is an independent and equal coordinate branch of the government.
Courts were established for the purpose of administering justice judicially, and it
has been said that their powers are coequal with their duties. In other words, they
have inherent power to do everything that is necessary to carry out the purpose
of their creation.
Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 498, 29 N.E.2d 405, 407-08
(1940). See generally A. VANDEmILT, THE DOCtRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS
PREsENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE (1963); M. VILE, CONSrITUrIONALI M AND THE SEPARATION OF
Powans (1967); Ervin, Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 85 LAw & CONTEMP.
PaoB. 108 (1970); Parker, The Historic Basis of Administrative Law: Separation of Powers
and Judicial Supremacy, 12 RuTroms L. REv. 449 (1958); Sharp, The Classical American
Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U. Cm. L. REv. 385 (1935).
54 R. DISHmAN, STATE CONsTrrIIONS: THE SHAPE oF THE DOCUMENT 2 (1960).
55 Speaking on the administration of the courts, Henry P. Chandler, former Director
of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, observed:
Nearly every federal administrator will testify, I think, that the efficiency of his
agency depends to a considerable degree upon the adequacy of the appropriations
made for it by the Congress. Certainly this has been true in my experience with
the appropriations for the courts. When they are insufficient, the supporting per-
sonnel of the courts and their facilities have to be restricted. Nearly every im-
provement in the work of the courts calls for added personnel or more or better
office facilities, which cost money.
Chandler, The Federal Judicial Administration from the Standpoint of the Administrative
Office, 16 U. Cm. CoNFREN CE SERas 3, 6 (1956).
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cial branch authority to determine the amount of funds necessary to
fulfill its constitutional responsibilities. This undermining of the tra-
ditional legislative dominion over appropriation and executive control
over fiscal administration is but an extension of the constitutional
principle that the legislature and executive cannot cripple the courts
by reducing or refusing necessary appropriations.
Judicial fiscal independence is not, as some have asserted, viola-
tive of the separation of powers doctrine;"6 rather, it is necessary for the
preservation of that doctrine. Adherence to traditional methods of
raising and controlling public funds should not interfere with what
is fundamentally a judicial area of responsibility-insuring the viability
of court functions. To a degree the same logic applies to the expansion
and creation of new programs to meet the growing demands of the
legal system.57 At no time have the divisions of government been so
rigidly preserved that one branch could not assume duties of another
to ensure the adequate administration of its basic functions.5 Placing
the preservation and improvement of the judicial system beyond the
reach of political considerations may do more to promote the public
will as it is reflected in the constitution of government than would
leaving control entirely in legislative hands.
B. Developing the Standard
1. Future Application
The necessary and reasonable standard, being broader than the
Leahey and Judges tests, allows courts to use their inherent power
beyond mere performance of basic judicial tasks and to reach equally
legitimate, though not essential, duties. The proper constitutional role
of the judicial branch need not be defined solely in terms of protecting
minimum individual rights delineated in federal and state constitutions.
Yet the standards described in Leahey and Judges do not seem to justify
compulsion of funds for anything more than this bare minimum and
perhaps reflect a fear of usurping the prerogatives of the executive and
legislative branches. The Carroll standard of reasonableness, on the
56 See Brennan, Judicial Fiscal Independence, 23 U. FrA. L. REv. 277 (1971).
57 See notes 59-64 and accompanying text infra.
58 If we look into the constitutions of the several States, we find that, not-
withstanding the emphatical and, in some instances, the unqualified terms in
which [the separation of powers] axiom has been laid down, there is not a single
instance in which the several departments of power have been kept absolutely
separate and distinct.
THE FEDEmLasr No. 47, at 339 (B. Wright ed. 1966) (J. Madison). See also cases cited in the
Carroll case, 442 Pa. 45, 52-53, 274 A.2d 193, 197 (1971).
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other hand, could be extended to compel funds for programs expanding
present judicial functions. 9
The capacity of judges in juvenile and domestic relations courts
to act as arbitrators and counselors in addition to hearing and deciding
cases is widely recognized.0 The fair and thorough evaluation of peti-
tions for probation requires substantial judicial time and attention."'
Under the more restrictive standards, the injustice that may result from
not conducting such activities may be considered insufficient to jeopar-
dize "essential court functions." Judges may also perceive a need for the
courts to provide investigators to aid the counsel of indigents, to assign
counsel for indigents in both criminal and civil cases, or to appoint
court masters or impartial experts in certain cases. 62 In each of these
examples the Carroll model for the exercise of inherent power may
provide the means to compel necessary funding. The problems of op-
pressive delay and congestion in the courts may also be partially resolved
through application of the reasonable necessity standard, whereas it
may be more difficult to justify remedial action to the extent necessary
under the Leahey and Judges models. 63
The inherent power doctrine has not yet been used to demand
additional resources for new programs instituted through the judiciary's
initiative. The logical extension of the reasonable and necessary stan-
dard for the exercise of judicial inherent power leads the courts in such
a direction. Although the courts may as yet be reluctant to exercise
such coercive force in any but the most severe cases of legislative in-
transigence, the broader standard of Carroll would certainly not pre-
clude this more creative use of inherent power.
2. Limitations on the Use of Inherent Power
The Carroll standard demands caution and circumspection to pre-
serve independent identity and balance among legislative, executive,
59 Justice Roberts in Carroll questioned the majority's elimination of requested funds
for the bail project. 442 Pa. at 60, 274 A.2d at 204-05 (dissenting opinion). While the
majority held the expense to be "without the limits of judicial responsibility," Justice
Roberts asserted that the project was not only an "opportunity to improve the adminis-
tration of justice" but also a cost saving device as well. Id. at 62, 274 A.2d at 206. The
court's division on this point reveals that even the most progressive court thus far has
set limits upon new extensions of court services.
60 James, Crisis in the Courts, 51 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 283, 286 (1968); Virtue, Improving
Metropolitan Justice-A Guide to Court Organization, 48 J. AM. JuD. Soc'y 23, 26-27 (1964).
61 L. DowNm, JusTicE DFNiED: THE CAsE FoR REFORM Or THE CoURTs 48 (1971).
62 Peck, Court Organization and Procedures To Meet the Need of Modern Society,
33 IuD. L.J. 182 (1958).
63 For example, use of the inherent power might have been extended to compel the
resources necessary for the implementation of a judicially promulgated speedy trial rule.
Cf. note 12 supra.
[Vol. 57:975
JUDICIAL FINANCIAL AUTONOMY
and judicial branches of government. Implicit in the function of
democratic government is the assumption that each branch will act
reasonably and will respect the limits of its power.614 Even without this
tacit restraint, the threat of a fiscal crisis,65 the threat of the removal
of judges through impeachment66 or elective processesY7 and the threat
of constitutional amendment 8 impose further constraints upon judicial
extravagance.
While certain forces external to the system may establish limits on
judicial inherent power, other factors may serve to control abuses as
well. The judicial branch functions within a framework of traditional
attitudes toward the judicial role which tend to dampen judicial
enthusiasm for departure from the traditional view of a court's func-
tion.69 The conception of what constitutes the proper function of the
court system in light of the demands placed upon it has been rapidly
changing, however, and dependence on history as a limiting factor may
be only partially satisfactory.
The concept of reasonable and necessary expenses may also be
limited by the government's financial status.7 0 Whether a court should
64 It is incumbent upon each department to assert and exercise all its power
whenever public necessity requires it to do so; otherwise, it is recreant to the
trust reposed in it by the people. It is equally incumbent upon it to refrain from
asserting a power that does not belong to it, for this is equally a violation of the
people's confidence.
State ex rel. Schneider v. Cunningham, 39 Mont. 165, 168, 101 P. 962, 963-64 (1909).
65 See notes 70-71 and accompanying text infra.
66 See generally THE FEDERALsr No. 81, at 508-09 (B. Wright ed. 1966) (A. Hamilton).
67 See, e.g., Carlson v. State ex rel. Stodola, 247 Ind. 631, 638-39, 220 NE.2d 532, 536
(1966), where the court observed that "there comes a time when a judge or any other
public official must make an accounting to the voters for his actions, if arbitrary, ex-
travagant or not in the public interest."
68 N.Y. CONsr. art. VI, §§ 29(c), (d) exemplify such a constitutionally imposed limita-
tion:
c. Insofar as the expense of the courts is borne by the state or paid by the state
in the first instance, the final determination of the itemized estimates of the
annual financial needs of the courts shall be made by the legislature and the
governor in accordance with articles four and seven of this constitution.
d. Insofar as the expense of the courts is not paid by the state in the first
instance and is borne by counties, the city of New York or other political sub-
divisions, the final determination of the itemized estimates of the annual financial
needs of the courts shall be made by the appropriate governing bodies of such
counties, the city of New York or other political subdivisions.
In its 1958 report, the Temporary Commission on the Courts, the body which drafted
article VI of the N.Y. Constitution, said of section 29 that "[flt should be emphasized that,
under the Commission's recommendations, all budget requests are, as the name implies,
requests and will be finally determined by the appropriating agencies as, in their wisdom,
they deem right." 1958 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 36, at 24 (emphasis in original).
69 A recognized test of whether a function is judicial is whether it is one that courts
have historically performed. See LeRoy v. Special Ind. School Dist., 285 Minn. 236, 241-42,
172 N.W.2d 764, 768 (1969).
70 [Mjandamus will not issue, as a rule, where it is apparent that the writ will
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share the burdens of fiscal drought is a perplexing problem. While the
Carroll majority maintained otherwise, fiscal context arguably should
affect the court's interpretation of reasonable and necessary expenses.71
Expansion of court programs in the face of inadequate revenues and
capacity taxation is unjustified. It is a proper use of inherent power,
however, for the courts. to demand those funds which have been denied
by the legislature, despite obvious judicial need, for reasons of political
expediency, election tactics, or mere niggardliness.
William Scott Ferguson
be futile or ineffectual by reason of the inability of the respondent to comply
therewith. Although want of funds may not be conclusive ground against issuing
the writ, and may not always prevent such issuance, the court in its discretion
may refuse the remedy if it is satisfied that the respondent has not the necessary
money or the means of procuring it to comply with the mandate.
Commissioner ex rel. McIaughlin v. Erie County, 375 Pa. 344, 350, 100 A.2d 601, 604
(1953).
7- Like the other branches, the judicial branch should work within the framwork of
realistic fiscal policy. In his concurring opinion in Carroll, Justice Jones reflects this
concern and criticizes the majority for not considering the financial plight of the city. 442
Pa. at 58-59, 274 A.2d at 204 (concurring opinion).
